

Povzetek

V diplomskem delu je na začetku prvega dela predstavljena splošna teorija ravnotežja v ekonomiji, Walrasovo ravnotežje, Paretov optimum, Hildenbrandova izboljšava modela in Aumannov model. V nadaljevanju si s pomočjo topologije ogledamo lastnosti preferenčne relacije pri posameznikih, pokažemo alternativno pot v Teoriji preko teorije iger. Zaključimo s trenutnimi smernicami razvoja teorije. Model uporabljen v splošni teoriji ravnotežja sem priredil za modeliranje Socialne politike. Osnovna predpostavka o neuplivanju na cene se spremeni v predpostavko o neuplivanju na količine dobrin, kar nam da simetričen model, ki pa je bolj primeren netržnim dobrinam, torej nekaterim državnim storitvam. Model sem utemeljil z najnovejšimi spoznanji o tendencah v svetu, preferencah posameznikov in oblikovanju Evropske Unije. Pokazal sem, da je diferenciacija socialne politike, v smislu proporcionalno neenakih davkov med članicami EU, optimalna po Paretu in torej omogoča večjo blaginjo kot pa homogena davčna politika. Poudaril sem še nekatere posledice izrekov teorije, predvsem vezane na modeliranje potrošnikov in njihove preference.

Ključne besede: modeli ekonomije, algebra, topologija, splošna teorija ravnotežja, javne dobrine, obnašanje potrošnikov, socialna politika, Evropska Unija.

Abstract

The beginning of this work consists of introducing General Equilibrium Theory, Walrasian equilibrium, Pareto optimum, Hildenbrand's contribution and Aumann's model. In next chapters topology is used to explore preference relation of individuals, followed by an alternative route in General Equilibrium Theory through Game Theory. First part of the work is ended with current trends and development in theory. Model used in the General Equilibrium Theory is changed to fit Social policy modelling more. Basic assumption of inability to influence prices is changed to inability to influence quantities, which gives us a symmetrical model, more suitable for nontradable commodities, such as some state services. This change in model was supported by the latest findings on current development of economies and markets, preferences and forming of the European Union. It was showed that differentiated social policy, in a sense of disproportional taxes amongst member countries, yields Pareto optimal equilibrium and thus provides greater welfare compared to homogeneous tax policy. I have emphasized some of the consequences of the theorems within the theory associated to the modelling of consumers and their preferences.

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